We almost had Bin Laden. In 2001, special operators had tracked him for days using a radio they had pulled from an enemy corpse. The noose was almost closed; allied troops were close enough to hear Bin Laden on the radio, apologizing to his followers for having led them "into this trap." The CIA officer in charge, Gary Bernstein, radioed his superiors for reinforcements to move in and capture the Al Qaeda leader. The response came after a long wait; there would be no reinforcements. President Bush relied on the word of President Pervez Musharraf that Pakistani forces would cut off Bin Laden's escape.
They didn't get him.
Perhaps that's our relationship with Musharraf in miniature; we depend on him, and he lets us down. After 6 years of cooperation with this reluctant ally, we ought to state what we've a complished, realistically assess how well this relationship is working out, and figure out where to go from there.
To establish a background, let's first be clear--he's not really a President; he took power in a 1999 coup. He currently faces fierce opposition throughout his country; powerful fundamentalist groups reject his rule, and he alienated Pakistan's legal system when he suspended Chief Justice Chaudhry in March 2007. These developments have made him quite cognizant of how tenuous his hold on power is.
Since 9/11, he's decided to take advantage of America's need for friends in the region to gain legitimacy for his regime; by ostensibly supporting the war on the Taliban, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, Musharraf has garnered an incredible amount of military aid--Pakistan is now the 3rd largest recipient of U.S. military aid, having netting $4.75 billion through between 2001 and 2006, with another $1 billion requested for 2007. Perhaps more importantly, he enjoys American diplomatic support and validation of his rule.
In return, Pakistan plays a major rule in policing the Afghanistan border region, a stronghold of the Taliban. A 2006 Seton Hall study found that Pakistan captured at least 36 percent, and likely as many as 66 percent, of 516 Guantánamo Bay detainees during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This highlights an American weakness in that region that we still deal with today--there are simply too few Americans on the ground, and not enough legislative or public support to get them there. To achieve objectives in the 1,500 mile-long border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Bush administration has instead relied upon foreign nationals to provide manpower; in this case, that means the Pakistanis.
Musharraf's efficacy in dealing with fundamentalists is questionable, however. The border regions (specifically, the FATA, or Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) are not truly a part of either Afghanistan or Pakistan; rather, they are small enclaves ruled by local tribesmen who do not identify with either state. Islamabad's reach does not extend to these places, such that Musharraf lacks the capability to police them effectively. Moreover, there are doubts that Pakistan has the will to truly engage the Taliban, even had it the capability; while Musharraf himself is a secularist, elements of his military may be sympathetic to the fundamentalist cause of the Taliban. U.S. government documents, recently obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request, show that Pakistan supplied both arms and troops to the Taliban in the 1990's.
We're dealing, then, with a nebulous border region that Pakistan lacks both the strength and will to control. Musharraf, of course, wants America to believe otherwise; if he's useless to America, then the Bush administration will abandon him, and he'll be without his strongest supporter. Bush, too, isn't likely to admit how bleak the situation is; otherwise, he'd have to explain why we've spent six years and $4.75 billion to no purpose.
Nonetheless, we've got to deal with the facts; Pakistan can't and won't help us. If we want to go after the Taliban in the border, it's going to take a real commitment of US troops (NATO has refused to help), and it's going to mean angering every tribe in the FATA, and Pakistan to boot. If those consequences are too much for us, then let's cleanse our hands of all this, instead of throwing money at a dictator and pretending that we're making progress. If we're in, let's be in; if we're out, then let's get out.
Musharraf is not likely long for this world; he's unwilling to provide the devoted support the United States wants, while any support he does provide the Americans reduces his popularity among the Muslim population.
I won't be shedding any tears for him. One must question, after all, how America has been aiding the development of democracy by supporting a dictator.
Seth Pate wonders why the "surge" went to Baghdad and not to Afghanistan...oh, right--there's no oil in Afghanistan. Excoriate him at: spate@asu.edu.