With opium production at an all-time high in Afghanistan, US officials have a new plan in mind to combat drug production. This one's not going to work, either.
Recently released UN figures show that, despite a $1 billion effort by British, American, and Afghan officials, Afghanistan's 2007 opium production was the highest on record.
Most of the world's opium, which is used to synthesize heroin, is produced in Afghanistan; some estimates show that the opium and heroin industry accounts for a third of Afghanistan's economy and 93% of the world opium market.
Poppy growth has expanded wildly since Harmid Karzai's government took control in 2002.
Immediately prior to that, the Taliban instituted a campaign against opium in an attempt to seem like a legitimate government. The fundamentalists used draconian methods that proved effective; in 2001, the United Nations Office for Drug Control & Crime Prevention found that Afghanistan produced only 185 tons.
When the Northern Alliance and its US allies ousted the Taliban, the transitional government was unable to exert much influence outside of Kabul. Lacking governmental oversight, poor farmers began to grow illicit poppy crops again.
I ought to be clear on that point — poppies aren't grown by shadowy figures in secretive labs. Impoverished farmers attracted by the prospect of large returns grow poppies; they solicit to drug traffickers, who process the opium into heroin and then sell it to the world market at a much higher price. The farmers don't make enough to get wealthy (the drug traffickers make sure to keep them poor and thus tractable), but they certainly make more than they would growing wheat.
NATO, which supports the Afghan government, has been running extensive anti-drug operations; they've succeeded in converting some of the northern territories where government control is strongest, from poppy production. Their efforts have been offset by a massive increase in production in the south, particularly in Helmand province, where the Taliban hold sway.
The Taliban run protection operations; they prevent government forces from eradicating the poppy fields. In return, they enjoy support from the public, who depend on the poppies for their livelihoods; they also receive much-needed kickbacks from the drug traffickers.
Though the Afghan government, at least at the high levels, is committed to stopping the opium trade, their options are limited. While legalization might curtail the black market trade and benefit Afghanistan with a new funding source, US officials won't endorse it — ostensibly because world demand is already met — but perhaps because the US won't support opium production, licit or not. Some have suggested spraying farmers' fields with pesticides, but such a heavy-handed tactic is likely to drive farmers into the arms of the Taliban for protection.
The new US plan, which is still fairly inchoate, involves using the already-exhausted 26,000-strong US force in Afghanistan to aid counter-drug efforts. Apparently, up until now, the British have handled counter-narcotics; US troops have been barred from participating in poppy eradication. Oddly enough, the government has reduced funding for the counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan; it's down from $1 billion in 2007 to $628 million for the coming year.
The plan will likely fail. Even if US troops can be spared from the war against the Taliban to go off destroying poppy plants, those crops can always be re-planted. This policy is too focused on symptomatic concerns like arresting drug traffickers and using force to control farmers. Perhaps this would work if Karzai had control over all the country — but he doesn't. The farmers, especially in the south, are left to themselves, and they'll always choose to plant poppies rather than onions and cattle feed.
Poppy production will continue in Afghanistan as long as the country lacks a stable government that can enforce its own drug laws; Afghan forces need to win their war with the Taliban, and to that end, US troops are better used fighting insurgents than poppies. It's true that the Taliban derive a substantial portion of their funds from opium production, but the answer to this is not eradication; farmers need to have viable alternatives to poppy planting. As long as it's more profitable to farm poppies than licit crops, the farmers in Helmand province and elsewhere will produce opium.
Seth Pate is a libertarian and has a libertarian's views on drugs. That is only one of the many reasons why he is unpopular. Disagree with him at spate@asu.edu.
